KARASTELEV.DOC

01/13/03 1:12 PM

ON THE OUTSIDE SEEKING IN: MUST
INTERVENORS DEMONSTRATE STANDING
TO JOIN A LAWSUIT?
JULIET JOHNSON KARASTELEV
INTRODUCTION
The law’s traditional conception of a “case” has evolved from a
discrete dispute between two adverse parties to a multiparty structure
covering a range of related and often conflicting interests.1 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide several avenues for expanding
the involved participants in a case beyond a single plaintiff and single
defendant to include other affected or interested parties.2 Intervention under Rule 24 is the vehicle nonparties use to protect their interests from potential impairment by a court’s adjudication of a dispute
between the original parties. By allowing nonparties to intervene,
Rule 24 lets them represent their interests and arguably improves the
court’s decisionmaking by allowing the presentation of different
viewpoints and evidence.3 Courts may also benefit from granting moCopyright © 2002 by Juliet Johnson Karastelev.
1. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 250–55 (1990) (discussing Article III limits on who can participate in a case); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84 (1976) (describing the federal courts
move away from adjudicating bipolar private law disputes to sprawling multiparty litigation
about constitutional and statutory rights).
2. See generally Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO.
L.J. 1204 (1966) (summarizing the 1966 amendments to the Rules that affected party structure,
including joinder, intervention, and class action); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356 (1967) (describing the major multiparty practice reforms to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1966).
3. See Ellyn J. Bullock, Note, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing’s
Criteria Should Not Be Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 605, 628
(1990) (arguing that intervenors perform a public service by presenting an issue from a different
vantage point); Brian Hutchings, Note, Waiting for Divine Intervention: The Fifth Circuit Tries
to Give Meaning to Intervention Rules in Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 43 VILL. L. REV.
693, 733–34 (1998) (noting that one rationale for liberal intervention is to improve the flow of
relevant information to the court in making decisions that have far-reaching effects).
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tions to intervene, because by including intervenors up front, they
4
may be spared relitigation of the same issue.
A recent decision in the Ninth Circuit, United States v. City of
5
Los Angeles, helps illustrate the concept of intervention. In the wake
of a widely publicized scandal regarding the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)’s use of excessive force, false arrests, and improper
search and seizures, the U.S. Department of Justice negotiated a
resolution of these constitutional violations with the Los Angeles City
Council, the Board of Police Commissioners, and the LAPD.6 Before
the federal district court entered the consent decree, the police officers’ union (the Police League) and community groups dedicated to
police reform (the Community Intervenors) sought leave to intervene.7 Although the city defendants had already conceded liability
and accepted the settlement terms, the court recognized the unique
positions of these nonparties. The Police League had an interest in
whether the consent decree would affect the terms and conditions of
8
its members’ employment. The Community Intervenors, who represented both victims of the unconstitutional police misconduct and
community activists that had collaborated on past reform efforts, had
an interest in the implementation of the consent decree.9 Intervention
allows nonparties like these, with substantial interests in the outcome
of a matter, to participate in an ongoing litigation if they meet the requirements of Rule 24.10
A nonparty may demand to intervene as of right, under Rule
11
24(a), or seek permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). This Note
focuses on intervention as of right, because the federal courts of appeals are split regarding its proper application. At first glance, Rule
24(a)(2) appears to be a straightforward multifactor test.12 Article III
4. See Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the
Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 279–80 (1999) (discussing the
benefit of disposing of all issues in a single lawsuit to avoid later lawsuits).
5. 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002).
6. Id. at 396.
7. Id. at 396–97.
8. Id. at 400.
9. Id. at 397.
10. The court granted the Police League’s motion to intervene as of right, and remanded to
the lower court the question of whether the Community Intervenors should be granted permissive intervention. Id. at 404.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
12. The first clause of Rule 24, which is not controversial, permits intervention when “a
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene.” FED. R. CIV. P.
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13
standing is neither implicated by the bare language of Rule 24 nor
referenced in the few Supreme Court decisions applying it.14 Nonetheless, the federal courts of appeals are split over whether, in addition to satisfying the four-part test of Rule 24(a)(2), an intervenor
must also prove that he has a justiciable case or controversy with his
15
adversary. There is also no consensus among the circuits about
whether standing is equivalent to Rule 24(a)(2)’s elusive “interest”
requirement.16
In this Note, I argue that a prospective intervenor should meet
Article III standing requirements, in addition to Rule 24(a)’s test,
17
only when the intervenor has or could be subject to a claim to relief.
If instead, the intervenor merely seeks to protect an interest that
might be impaired by the outcome of a lawsuit, rather than present or
defend against a legal claim, then satisfying Rule 24(a)’s factors
should be sufficient.18

24(a)(1). The second clause requires that the applicant (1) make a timely motion; (2) claim an
interest relating to the subject of the lawsuit; (3) allege a likely impairment of his interest if the
lawsuit proceeds without him; and (4) convince the court that an existing party to the lawsuit
cannot adequately represent his interests. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
13. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81
(2000), for the Supreme Court’s most recent exposition of Article III’s standing requirements,
i.e., that
a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
14. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) (analyzing intervention of right by the Rule’s literal terms without recourse to Article III standing analysis);
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 527 (1971) (same); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134 (1967) (same).
15. In other words, if the intervenor seeks to join the plaintiff’s side in a case (plaintiffintervenor), he would have to demonstrate Article III standing. If the intervenor seeks to support the defendant’s position (defendant-intervenor), the question is whether the plaintiff has a
justiciable case with the defendant-intervenor.
16. See infra Part II for discussion of the circuit split.
17. Relief is used as shorthand for the range of legal actions an intervenor might pursue, or
that might be pursued against him, such as damages, injunctions, declaratory judgments, etc.
18. For example, in United States v. City of Los Angeles, the DOJ and the Police League
did not have legal claims against one another, but there was a risk that the consent decree negotiated with the official city parties could impact on the Police League’s members’ interests. See
supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. In such a situation, I argue that the Police League
should not have to demonstrate that it has a justiciable case with the DOJ. By contrast, if the
Community Intervenors sought relief, such as damages, from the City for the unconstitutional
police misconduct, then they should be required to demonstrate Article III standing.
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In Part I of this Note, I provide a brief primer on Article III
standing and summarize the roots and interpretation of Rule 24. In
Part II, I lay out the current circuit split on the relationship between
intervention and standing. In Part III, I criticize the proposition that
Article III standing should always be an additional prerequisite to intervention. Likewise, in Part IV, I argue that interpreting the “interest” requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) as equivalent to Article III standing is equally misguided. Finally, in Part V, I propose that Article III
standing is an appropriate additional test for intervenors when they
seek, or may be subject to, some form of relief but not when they are
merely attempting to protect an interest.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL PROCEDURE UNDERPINNINGS
OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ARTICLE III STANDING AND RULE 24’S
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT
In order to assess the relevance, if any, of Article III standing to
intervention as of right, it is first necessary to understand the purposes and operation of both doctrines. To that end, in this Part, I present the key concepts of Article III standing and intervention, including their respective tests.
A. Article III Standing in a Nutshell
Standing is the familiar shorthand for “whether the plaintiff has
made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant
19
within the meaning of Art[icle] III.” The black letter rule is that in
order to satisfy Article III, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered,
or will suffer, a distinct and palpable injury that is caused by the defendant’s conduct and that is redressable by the court.20 In addition to
the constitutional requirements of injury, causation, and redressability, the standing doctrine encompasses several prudential considera21
tions. Key among them is the prohibition on generalized griev-

19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
20. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (summarizing the “irreducible minimum” that a party must show to gain
access to the federal courts); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE
L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (outlining the “numbingly familiar” black letter doctrine of standing).
21. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474 (“Beyond the constitutional requirements,
the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question
of standing.”).
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22
ances—“abstract questions of wide public significance” —in order
“to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes.”23
In the Warren Court era, federal courts were relatively lenient
toward plaintiffs that sought to litigate shared public interests or constitutional values, even when they were not more demonstrably in24
jured than members of the general population. By contrast, the
Rehnquist Court has since made clear in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild25
life that a plaintiff must have suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized,”26 and that he
must be “‘directly affected apart from [his] ‘special interest in th[e]
27
subject.’” Lujan thus elevated the ban on generalized grievances
from a prudential concern to a constitutional mandate.28 Leaving
aside the merits or constitutional validity of a stringent injury requirement for standing, applying the test in the intervention context is
contrary to Rule 24’s purpose of addressing anticipated injuries.29
The Lujan decision was also important for its reaffirmation that
the standing requirements of Article III are immutable; that is, Congress may not legislate around the concrete injury requirement. The
Court rejected Congress’s attempt in the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) to convert an undifferentiated public interest in the executive
branch’s compliance with ESA procedures into an individual right
30
vindicable in the courts. In other words, even if Congress created a
legal right that was subsequently invaded, that violation alone would
not constitute an injury for the purposes of Article III.31 The injury
would still need to meet Article III constitutional standards of concreteness and distinctness. Lujan thus raised to new heights the Su-

22. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1968) (finding that a taxpayer had standing to protest federal subsidies to parochial schools); Fletcher, supra note 20, at 227–28 (discussing the increase in public law litigation in the 1960s and 1970s).
25. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
26. Id. at 560.
27. Id. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735, 739 (1972)).
28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 95 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing generalized grievances as a constitutional bar).
29. See infra Part IV.
30. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
31. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1146–47 (1993) (remarking on the Court’s surprising holding that a statute’s conferral
of standing on a potential plaintiff was insufficient).
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preme Court’s interpretation of Article III’s standing requirements as
32
an “irreducible constitutional minimum.”
In addition to hardening the concrete injury requirement, some
on the Court, led by Justice Scalia, would like to tighten the redress33
ability prong of the Article III standing inquiry. Under current law, a
plaintiff need not show narrow tailoring of the remedy to his injury.34
But if it were otherwise, a requirement that intervenors demonstrate
that the court could fashion a precise remedy would be a substantial
barrier to their participation in the suit because their interest is often
indirect.
The Rehnquist Court’s strict interpretation of the concrete injury
requirement, and perhaps a similarly tough treatment of the redressability requirement in the future, is incompatible with the forms of
litigation produced by the expansion of class actions, intervention,
and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discussed in
35
Section B.
B. The Text and Purpose of Rule 24(a)(2)
In the vast majority of cases, the question of whether a prospective intervenor is required to have Article III standing arises in motions to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). In relevant part, the
Rule provides that
[u]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a prac-

32. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
33. In Lujan, Justices Rehnquist and Thomas joined Justice Scalia in arguing for a stringent
test that any remedial action taken by the court would precisely redress the plaintiff’s alleged
injury. 504 U.S. at 558–61.
34. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185–186
(2000) (holding, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, that generalized civil penalties for
violations of the Clean Water Act could satisfy the redressability requirement).
35. See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 329, 336
(2000) (commenting that the Supreme Court’s recent standing jurisprudence limits the federal
courts to a private law model that is inconsistent with congressionally created avenues for public
law litigation by statute or through amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For an
early recognition of the tension between a standing formula that attempts to limit who may sue
and intervention’s open invitation to persons with a significant (“a weasel word”) interest at risk
to participate in a lawsuit, see also Chayes, supra note 1, at 1290–91.
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tical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that
36
interest.

The above language dates to the 1966 amendments to the main Rules
governing party structure, which, in addition to Rule 24, included
37
Rule 19 (necessary party joinder) and Rule 23 (class actions). The
changes were premised on the belief that it was more efficient and
equitable to settle all issues arising from a single set of circumstances
in one lawsuit.38 Thus, the revised Rules gave courts pragmatic tools
for facilitating multiparty lawsuits—often over public interest contro39
versies rather than private disputes. Rule 24(a)(2) and Rule
40
19(a)(2)(i) shared the similar objective of reeling in nonparties with
interests that might be affected by resolution of a dispute before the
court. Although both provisions used identical language to describe
the nature and risk of impairment to an interest that might warrant
intervention or necessary joinder, neither articulated a definition of
“interest.”41
At a minimum, the revision to Rule 24 was intended to repudiate
the earlier narrow conception of “interest” as an interest in specific
property before the court, or of defining “impairment” as being le42
gally bound as a matter of res judicata. Nonetheless, Professor Benjamin Kaplan, one of the drafters of the amendments, wrote that the
altered phrasing of the interest requirement was still informed by the

36. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added).
37. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 87–109 (1966).
38. See Cohn, supra note 2, at 1204 (characterizing the purpose of the amended Rules as
placing all substantive issues in a case before a court with minimal procedural restrictions).
Judge Henry J. Friendly interpreted the 1966 amendments as a directive to the courts to be
flexible in considering all competing and relevant interests in order to reach pragmatic solutions
to a wide variety of intervention problems. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749
F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 422–23 (describing how the
1966 amendments created a veritable renaissance in public law litigation).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a):
A person . . . shall be joined as a party in the action if . . . (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest . . . .
41. In an early comment on the revision to the Rules, Professor David Shapiro argued that
it was unlikely that federal courts of appeals would give “interest” the same construction in
Rule 19 and Rule 24. See David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 757 (1968).
42. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109–11 (1966) (Advisory
Committee’s note).
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43
historic understanding of intervention —that the applicant demonstrate a “direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the pro44
45
ceedings.” Others rejected “a myopic fixation upon ‘interest,’” arguing that Rule 24’s test was “primarily a practical guide to disposing
of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is
compatible with efficiency and due process.”46 The debate about the
meaning of Rule 24’s “interest” remains to this day,47 and the Supreme Court has not clarified the matter.

C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretations of Rule 24 “Interest”
The Supreme Court’s few Rule 24 decisions have not elucidated
the criteria for evaluating whether an interest is sufficient to intervene. In its first interpretation of the amended Rule, in Cascade Natu48
ral Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the Court noted that the
drafters intended it to be not only a restatement, but also, an amplification of the previous federal practice, and commented that therefore
“some elasticity was injected; and the question is, how much.”49 Because the intervenor’s interests were “‘at the heart of the controversy,’”50the Court read the Rule broadly, thereby laying the ground51
work for a liberal approach to applying the amended Rule.
Greater clarity did not emerge from the Supreme Court’s subse52
quent interpretation of Rule 24(a)(2) in Donaldson v. United States.
In discussing the type of interest contemplated by the provision, the
Court stated “[w]hat is obviously meant there is a significantly pro43. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 405 (implying that the Supreme Court’s first interpretation of
the revised Rule went beyond the weight of the case authority on what constituted an interest).
44. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1908 (2d
ed. 1986 & Supp. 2002).
45. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
46. Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
47. This debate has led at least one scholar to posit that “it well may be that this is a question not worth answering.” 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 44, § 1908 (Supp. 2002).
48. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
49. Id. at 134.
50. Id. at 135 (quoting Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 506
(1941)).
51. Most scholars believe that the decision in Cascade should be held to its particular facts.
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 41, at 730 (“[T]he apparent novelty of the rulings on intervention
may have been largely a result of the Court’s dissatisfaction with the substantive provisions of
the [antitrust settlement] decree.”); Tobias, supra note 39, at 433 (commenting that the Court
wanted to facilitate intervention in a case that had national consequences and was also mindful
that the would-be intervenor was the State of California).
52. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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53
54
tectable interest.” Fifteen years later, in Diamond v. Charles, Justice
O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, stated, “[c]learly, Donaldson’s
requirement . . . calls for a direct and concrete interest that is ac55
corded some degree of legal protection.” As one commentator has
noted, these explanations “raise[ ] more questions than [they] answer[
], including how significant the interest must be, and by what means
56
the interest must be protectable.”
Diamond is important not for Justice O’Connor’s nebulous clarification of the meaning of “interest,” but rather, because it represents
the Court’s only ruling that partially addressed a question that had
begun to simmer amongst the federal courts of appeals—the rele57
vancy, if any, of Article III standing to intervention. The Court was
58
able to sidestep the issue because of Diamond’s atypical procedural
posture, in which the intervenor sought to appeal a decision accepted
by the original party. The Diamond Court held that “an intervenor’s
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”59 The result is logical because, if the intervenor did not have standing, there would be
60
no “case or controversy” before the court on appeal. The federal cir-

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
476 U.S. 54 (1986).
Id. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 263 (2000); see also Tobias, supra note 39, at 433 (observing that Justice
O’Connor’s clarification “provides little more guidance than the bare term interest” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
57. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 n.21 (citing federal circuit court cases that “reached varying
conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of right must himself possess standing”).
58. Id. at 68–69 (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a
district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements
of Art. III.”).
59. Id. at 68.
60. See Shapiro, supra note 41, at 753–54 (“Adding C to a litigation between A and B may
pose no problems under [A]rticle III . . . but permitting C to be the sole adversary of B on appeal . . . certainly does give difficulty since there is no real controversy between A and C.”).
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61

cuits have applied the Diamond holding with ease. As for the more
typical cases that are the subject of this Note—intervenors at the trial
court level—the Court left unsettled “the precise relationship between the interest required to satisfy the Rule [24(a)(2)] and the in62
terest required to confer standing.”
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Despite the fact that neither the Supreme Court, nor the plain
language or commentary to the amended Rule 24, required that intervenors have standing, the D.C. and Eighth Circuits have reached
the opposite conclusion, thereby creating a split with some of their
sister circuits (the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh), while
other circuits have remained on the sidelines. In Part II, I outline this
disagreement before analyzing its merits in Parts III and IV.
A. The D.C. and Eighth Circuits Require that Intervenors Have
Standing
The D.C. Circuit was the first both to raise the issue of standing
63
in the context of Rule 24 and to definitively hold, in City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,64 that standing was a prerequisite for intervention. The court explained that “because a Rule 24
61. See, e.g., Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that absent an appeal by the original defendant, the intervenors must have standing to pursue an appeal themselves); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 693 (6th
Cir. 1994) (holding that a trade association could not appeal a trial court decision that certain
apprenticeship laws were preempted if the State as original defendant chose not to appeal);
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that “‘post-judgment intervention
for purposes of appeal may be appropriate if the intervenors meet . . . traditional standing criteria’” (quoting Legal Aid Soc’y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1328 (9th Cir.
1979))).
62. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68. But see Appel, supra note 56, at 284–85 n.368 (arguing that
the Court implied that standing was not required when it stated that Diamond, who the Court
determined did not have standing, could have ridden piggyback on the state’s appeal had the
state pursued one).
63. In Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, the court stated that not just
“any” interest would do, but only a “legally protectable one,” which was “in any case required
by Article III.” 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court then decided that the would-be
intervenor did not have an interest without using the three-factor standing test. Id. at 781. Confusion in the D.C. Circuit as to the standard to intervene continued to reign, however. Compare
Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 191–94 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that an insurance company was entitled to intervene after straightforward application of Rule 24(a)(2) with
no mention of standing), with Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[A]n intervenor of right, just like an ordinary plaintiff, must have standing.”).
64. 17 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing with the original
parties to the suit, he must satisfy the standing requirements imposed
65
66
on those parties.” Although this rule was not consistently followed,
the circuit recently affirmed that Article III standing was required to
intervene, even when the statute in question included an open invitation to intervene by “communities, associations, corporations, firms,
67
and individuals, whose interests are affected.”
68
Departing from its prior precedent, a divided panel of the
69
Eighth Circuit established in Mausolf v. Babbitt that the “Constitution requires that prospective intervenors have Article III standing to
70
litigate their claims in federal court.” The court reasoned that an
“Article III case or controversy is one where all parties have standing,
and a would-be intervenor, because he seeks to participate as a party,
must have standing as well.”71 The court stated that “[t]he standing
requirement is, at its core, a constitutionally mandated prerequisite . . . and ‘an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.’”72 Finally, the court noted
that standing requirements helped ensure that federal courts did not
become “a forum for the airing of interested onlookers’ concerns, nor
an arena for public-policy debates.”73
B. Majority Rule: Standing Not Required of Intervenors
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that
as long as the plaintiff has standing to litigate, and thus a valid Article
65. Id. at 1517.
66. See, e.g., Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. ICC, 26 F.3d 1157, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(granting an association’s “motion to intervene without deciding whether it has Article III
standing”).
67. Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 178 F.3d 533, 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (2000)). For criticism of this decision see Recent Case, Rio
Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533 (DC Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1560–62
(2000) (chastising the court for abdicating its role as an adjudicator of public law disputes when
the statute had “wide open and inviting” language for intervention).
68. See United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1162 (8th Cir. 1995) (taking a liberal
view of whether the litigation’s outcome would impair the intervenor’s interest); Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Cmty. Action, 558 F.2d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing a community
group to intervene in the city’s defense of a local ordinance because of its general interest in
neighborhood property values).
69. 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
70. Id. at 1300.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 1301 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
73. Id.
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III case or controversy exists, prospective intervenors need not dem74
onstrate standing. Their rationale is that it is the plaintiff who establishes the case or controversy, and as long as he or she does not drop
out, other litigants may join or intervene in the matter if they meet
the respective requirements of the Federal Rules that permit such actions. In addition, these circuits support the view that Rule 24 represents a policy choice—how to streamline related issues into a single
lawsuit without it becoming unwieldy—rather than a deep constitu75
tional question. In fact, courts often fail to reach the standinginterest conundrum because pragmatic concerns—like timeliness and
inadequacy of representation—are embodied in the other prongs of
Rule 24 and provide an easier basis for decisionmaking.76
C. The Holdouts: Declining to Decide Whether Standing is a
Necessity for Intervenors
The First and the Ninth Circuits have not adopted a black letter
rule, but dicta in their opinions indicates that fulfillment of the inter-

74. See Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458, 463 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that a lack of
Article III standing is not dispositive in a motion to intervene); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830
(5th Cir. 1998) (“Article III does not require intervenors to independently possess standing
where intervention is into a subsisting and continuing Article III case or controversy . . . .”); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (“An intervenor need
not have the same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit in order to intervene in an existing . . .
suit where the plaintiff has standing.”); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir.
1978) (“The existence of a case or controversy having been established as between the Postal
Service and the Brennans, there was no need to impose the standing requirement upon the proposed intervenor.”).
75. Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d
837, 841 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). Ironically, Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit first articulated the pragmatic approach to Rule 24, see supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text, while that circuit now
takes a constitutional approach to the issue.
76. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 278 F.3d 1174, 1175, 1179 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming the denial of intervention to a community police association in an employment discrimination suit against the city, because the U.S. government adequately represented its interests);
Kleisser v. U.S. Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 969–71 (3d Cir. 1998) (summarizing the pragmatic
fact-specific inquiries that courts have followed in a wide variety of intervention cases); Bethune
Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988) (cutting short a discussion of the relevance of standing to intervention because Rule 24 presented two independently sufficient obstacles to the intervenor—its interests were not impaired and they were adequately represented);
Katharine Goepp, Note, Presumed Represented: Analyzing Intervention as of Right When the
Government is a Party, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 131, 155 (2002) (noting that some circuits presume adequate representation when the government is involved in a case, partly in the interests
of judicial economy and simplicity).
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77
est requirement usually means that standing is also met. By conflating the Article III standing test to having a “sufficient stake in the
controversy,” the First Circuit finds that it is largely interchangeable
78
with Rule 24’s “interest” concept. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, when
it has acknowledged the circuit split at all, has stated that its test of
the strength of the interest of the intervenor captures the principle of
79
standing. A recent Ninth Circuit case, however, ignored the split entirely, and analyzed an intervenor’s motion according to policy considerations of “efficient resolution of issues and broadened access to
the courts.”80 Neither the Third nor the Fourth Circuit have expressly
acknowledged or squarely addressed the circuit split.81
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s stance on the relationship between
Article III standing and intervention is difficult to characterize. The
circuit’s most prominent judges have opined on opposite sides of the

77. See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 821 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging that standing is “at least implicitly addressed by [the court’s] requirement that
the applicant must assert an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action” (quoting Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 n.1 (9th Cir.
1989))); Cotter v. Mass. Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, 219 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.
2000) (“[I]n the ordinary case, an applicant who satisfies the ‘interest’ requirement of the intervention rule is almost always going to have a sufficient stake in the controversy to satisfy Article
III as well.”).
78. See Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104,
110 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Although the two are not identical, the ‘interest’ required under Rule 24(a)
has some connection to the interest that may give the party a sufficient stake in the outcome to
support standing under Article III.”).
79. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining to
incorporate an independent standing inquiry into the circuit’s test for intervention but noting
that standing is implicitly addressed by Rule 24’s interest requirement).
80. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002) (“By allowing
parties with a practical interest in the outcome of a particular case to intervene, we often prevent or simplify future litigation involving related issues; at the same time, we allow an additional interested party to express its views before the court.” (quoting Forest Conservation
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995))).
81. In McKay v. Heyison, 614 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1980), the court appeared to assume that an
intervenor must have standing, and analyzed his motion accordingly, ultimately holding that he
had standing, even though his injury was speculative in nature. Id. at 905. The court has not,
however, established a rule since the circuit split emerged. The Fourth Circuit has also not addressed the circuit split, but in a decision involving permissive intervention, noted that “possession of Article III standing is interwoven into the very concept of plaintiff status . . . . A permissive intervenor without standing may continue to be a party so long as the suit is kept alive by
the plaintiff.” Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
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82

issue. At one point, when the standing hurdle was perceived as more
liberal and less rigorous than the Rule 24 interest requirement—
which is no longer true—the court held that “[t]he interest of a
proposed intervenor . . . must be greater than the interest sufficient to
83
satisfy the standing requirement.” In another opinion, the circuit
appeared to take it as a given that intervenors demonstrate standing.84
In yet another decision, the court noted that the interest required to
85
intervene was equivalent to that required for standing. Perhaps recognizing the confusion in its case law, the Seventh Circuit’s most recent
opinions avoid the question altogether.86
The circuits that have taken a stance on whether standing should
be required of intervenors present it as a black-or-white choice. In
Part III, I evaluate the position that intervenors must universally
demonstrate Article III standing in addition to meeting Rule
24(a)(2)’s test. I analyze the alternative use of standing—as a proxy
for Rule 24(a)(2)’s interest requirement—in Part IV. Finally, in Part
V, I propose that instead of a one-size-fits-all rule, a more nuanced
approach to Article III standing and intervention is called for. Specifically, intervenors who either seek relief, or are at risk of being
subject to relief by one of the parties, should demonstrate Article III
standing. By contrast, intervenors who want to protect an interest
should be held to the literal test of Rule 24(a)(2), and courts should
make greater use of their existing discretion to tailor their participation in litigation to ensure that they do not ambush the case.

82. Judge Frank Easterbrook speculated in Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525,
531 (7th Cir. 1988), that where a prospective intervenor “could not have initiated this suit . . . it
seems to follow that [he] may not intervene either.” Judge Richard Posner, in Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996),
noted that the best rationale for intervention was where the intervenor could not initiate his
own suit but had an interest that might be harmed.
83. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1988).
84. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 101 F.3d at 507 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The
threatened injury would give him the minimal standing required by Article III, which our court
requires of any intervenor.”).
85. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Any interest
of such magnitude [to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)] is sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirement as well.”).
86. See Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 1009, 1017–20 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying
intervention by analyzing Rule 24’s requirements with no reference to Article III standing); Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) (declining to “explore further what the outer boundaries of standing to intervene might be”).
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III. STANDING AS AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR
INTERVENORS AS OF RIGHT
The point of contention between the Eighth and D.C. Circuits on
the one hand, and the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other, is whether standing should be incorporated into
intervention cases as an additional requirement. In other words,
should an intervenor be required to satisfy Article III standing (injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability), as well as the four factors
of Rule 24(a) (timeliness, interest, impairment, and inadequacy of
representation)? The first rationale for this burden is that the Consti87
tution mandates that all parties to litigation have standing, otherwise, if “joined by intervenors who lack standing, [it] is—put
bluntly—no longer an Article III case or controversy.”88 The second
rationale is that, if intervenors seek to participate in a case with the
full procedural rights of parties, then they should be held to the same
test for parties.89 Careful analysis of these rationales reveals the limitations of the former, and the merits of the latter.
A. Intervenors Without Standing Threaten The Integrity Of An
Article III Case
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Mausolf v. Babbitt contains the
fullest explication of the proposition that all parties, including intervenors, must have Article III standing, or else the case or controversy
90
requirement is not met and the federal court lacks jurisdiction. The
Mausolf court recognized that Rule 24(a)(2) promotes the efficient
“use of judicial resources by allowing persons, who might otherwise
have to bring a lawsuit on their own to protect their interests . . . to
91
join an ongoing lawsuit instead.” But it held that regardless of the
pragmatic benefits of Rule 24, “Congress cannot circumvent Article
III’s limits on the judicial power.”92 Paralleling the Supreme Court’s
87. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
88. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
89. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reaffirming
the circuit rule that intervenors who wish to participate on “equal footing” with the original parties must satisfy Article III standing).
90. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1301. For a full description of the merits of the lawsuit and its complex procedural history, see generally Rebecca Williams, Comment, Winter Wonderland: Intervention, Endangered Species and Snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park, 5 MO. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 165 (1998).
91. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1300.
92. Id.

KARASTELEV.DOC

470

01/13/03 1:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:455

Lujan reasoning that Congress could not bypass Article III standing
requirements by statute, the Mausolf court held that Congress could
93
not evade Article III through a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
Thus, to the Mausolf court, it is immaterial that Rule 24(a)’s language
does not mention standing, because it is elementary that standing is
94
mandatory for entry into the federal courts. The Mausolf court also
justifies its position on prudential grounds—that barring intervenors
with mere interests helps prevent “the conversion of [federal]
courts . . . into judicial versions of college debating forums.”95
While no one contests that federal jurisdiction is predicated on
the existence of an Article III case or controversy, many bristle at the
Eighth and D.C. Circuits’ novel extension of standing requirements
96
from a plaintiff’s hurdle to a test for “all parties” involved in the
97
lawsuit. First, other circuits and commentators point out that federal
jurisdiction vests once the plaintiff has demonstrated standing, and
the addition of other parties does not rob a case of its Article III
status. Second, if allowing a party without standing to intervene under
Rule 24(a) destroys the case, then, logically, necessary parties joined
under the identically phrased Rule 19 must also prove standing or the
case implodes, a consequence so far ignored by both the courts and
legal commentators. Likewise, courts could not grant permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) without testing for standing, a position
no court has adopted.
1. Only Plaintiffs Must Meet Article III Standing Requirements.
Commentators who have addressed the merits of the Eighth Circuit’s
constitutional analysis contend that federal courts have a justiciable
case or controversy, provided that one party has standing to sue, even
93. Id.
94. Michael K. Horn, Case Note, Standing in When the Government Bows Out: Mausolf v.
Babbitt, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 72, 81 (1998) (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s
pronouncement that Rule 24 is “only applicable after intervenors have satisfied the Constitutional prerequisites”).
95. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)).
96. Id. at 1300.
97. Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998) (criticizing the D.C., Seventh, and
Eighth circuits for offering little justification for their “new requirement” that intervenors “possess standing as a matter of constitutional law”); see also Bullock, supra note 3, at 642
(“[A]pplication of standing to an intervention applicant and a defendant is a gigantic extension
of standing doctrine.”); Recent Case, supra note 67, at 1560 (arguing that by “expanding the
standing requirement to cover any party seeking to intervene,” the D.C. Circuit is failing in its
adjudication of public interest disputes (emphasis added)).
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98
if other participants lack standing. As Professor David Shapiro explains, “[p]erhaps it should go without saying, but . . . there is a difference between the question whether one is a proper plaintiff or defendant in an initial action and the question whether one is entitled to
intervene.”99 Persons may intervene in lawsuits only after a court has
examined all the justiciability doctrines and determines that it has a
100
genuine case or controversy before it. Thus, the inquiry should shift
to a pragmatic focus on whether the “prospective intervenor has a
sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute to the resolution of the controversy to justify his inclusion.”101 Given that the judicial machinery has already been mobilized, the consideration
should be whether the would-be intervenor’s interests could be
prejudiced by the pending case’s outcome and not whether he has
standing to pursue a case of his own.
Supreme Court precedent indicates that it is the party who in102
vokes the court’s authority that must demonstrate standing. Standing, as perhaps the most litigated element of the justiciability doctrine, often plays the pivotal role in determining the court’s subject

98. See United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 521 (9th Cir. 1977), rev’d
and vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (“A party seeking to intervene pursuant to
Rule 24 . . . need not possess the standing necessary to initiate the lawsuit.”); Appel, supra note
56, at 285 (“[T]he basic question of intervention differs from the question of whether the original plaintiff has standing to sue the original defendant, and the addition of an intervenor does
not alter the justiciability of the case.”); Bandes, supra note 1, at 312 (proposing that intervenors
should not be barred from court if the existing litigation already meets the demands of Article
III); Tobias, supra note 39, at 443 (“Numerous courts and commentators have convincingly contended that there is little, if any, reason to demand standing of an [intervenor] . . . because the
plaintiff has satisfied the case or controversy requirement [and] the judicial machinery has been
mobilized . . . .”); Jack B. Weinstein, Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions—Some Views on Participation, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 231, 241 (1980) (“Since the litigation is already pending, there is less reason to be as finicky about [the intervenor’s] standing
than there would be if the intervenor was commencing the suit.”).
99. Shapiro, supra note 41, at 726. Professor Shapiro’s dated exposition of this arguably
elementary principle continues to be widely cited. See, e.g., Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 832 (5th Cir. 1998)
(repeating Shapiro’s language in determining that Article III does not require each and every
participant in a case to have standing); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212 n.16 (11th Cir.
1989) (quoting Shapiro at length for the principle that “[i]ntervention under Rule 24 presumes
that there is a justiciable case into which an individual wants to intervene”).
100. See Shapiro, supra note 41, at 726 (noting that a court first decides “whether the controversy is ripe . . . whether the parties . . . are real parties in interest, and whether the interests
asserted are sufficient to mobilize the judicial machinery”).
101. Id.
102. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (stating that the party who initiates the lawsuit must show that he personally suffered some injury as a result of the illegal conduct of the defendant).
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103
matter jurisdiction over the action. Once the plaintiff has passed this
test, “the court’s jurisdiction vests . . . . The presence of additional
parties, although they alone could independently not satisfy Article
III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy jurisdiction already established.”104 An early Supreme Court decision indicated that “[m]uch
less is such jurisdiction defeated by the intervention . . . of a party
whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy of the
original parties.”105 By adhering to the rule that the original parties establish jurisdiction, one sidesteps the ramifications of carrying the
contrary principle to its natural conclusion, as discussed in Part
III.A.2.

2. Requiring Standing for Any Participant in a Lawsuit—Implications for Necessary Joinder and Permissive Intervention. If adding a
party without standing destroys a case or controversy,106 then those
parties joined under Rule 19 should also demonstrate standing, yet no
court has so held, including the Eighth and D.C. Circuits. As previously noted, Rule 19(a)(2)(i) has nearly identical language to Rule
24(a)(2)107 and shares a similar objective of protecting absent parties
from having their interests impaired by litigation in which they are
not involved. The Rules differ only in how they operate. Under Rule
19, the original parties have the burden to join nonparties that are
necessary to a fair adjudication of their dispute. Rule 24, by contrast,
requires nonparties to initiate their participation if they fear their interests might be impaired by an ongoing lawsuit.108 Although the close
similarity between the purpose and operation of the two Rules has

103. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (“[I]n terms of Article III limitations
on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”); Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212 (discussing the role of
standing in establishing a court’s jurisdiction over a case).
104. Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 832.
105. Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922).
106. Obviously, the “case or controversy” between the original plaintiff and defendant reconstitutes itself if the intervenor bows out.
107. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Although the similarity is noted in the leading treatise on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nothing is made of it. See 7C WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 44, § 1903 (“The description in Rule 24(a)(2) of persons who are to be allowed
to intervene of right is closely related to the description in Rule 19(a)(2)(i) of one of the classes
of persons needed for just adjudication.”).
108. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989), superceded by statute on other grounds, 42
U.S.C. 1981 (1991) (comparing the operations of the joinder and intervention rules).
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109
not gone unnoticed, surprisingly, no court has discussed applying
Article III standing to parties added to lawsuits through joinder. Yet,
if adding a party without standing to a case or controversy destroys its
integrity, then this consequence should befall joined parties as well.
In the same vein, parties that are added to a lawsuit under Rule
24(b), by means of permissive intervention, should also have standing,
110
or else the case or controversy will dissolve. Permissive intervention
may be granted if the “applicant’s claim or defense and the main ac111
tion have a question of law or fact in common.” A district court
judge has wide discretion in deciding whether permitting the intervention will “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
112
of the original parties.” Courts have interpreted Rule 24(b) generously: “the district court can consider almost any factor rationally
relevant but enjoys very broad discretion in granting or denying the
motion [to intervene].”113 If the Eighth and the D.C. Circuits are correct—and the Constitution requires that all parties to a lawsuit present a justiciable controversy—then there is no need for Rule 24(b).
Permissive intervention exists precisely to accommodate those parties
who do not have standing and do not have a sufficient interest to intervene as of right, but for other reasons convincing to the district
court should be included in the litigation.

109. Recent decisions note the parallels, but make nothing of it. See, e.g., United States v.
Tribal Dev’t Corp., 100 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The language of Rule 24(a)(2) tracks that
of Rule 19(a)(2)(i).”); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hyde Park Apartments, No. CV-94-00319GLT, 1996 WL 138558, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1996) (mentioning that the evaluation of
whether Rule 19(a)(2)(i) applies to the case “parallels the inquiry under Rule 24(a)”). Following the 1966 amendments to joinder and intervention, courts analyzed the meaning of the close
similarities in more depth. See Atlantis Dev’t Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 823–25 (5th
Cir. 1967) (recognizing the similar phrasing and underlying purposes of the two Rules, and analyzing the nonparty’s motion to join the lawsuit under both intervention and joinder); John E.
Kennedy, Let’s All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329, 344 (1969) (arguing that the analogous language of the two Rules indicates that courts should consider the
policies of Rule 19 in applying Rule 24, namely, the interests of the original parties and judicial
efficiency).
110. For an explicit treatment of the intersection of standing with permissive intervention
under Rule 24(b) see Amy M. Gardner, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion: Standing Requirements for Rule 24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (2002).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).
112. Id.
113. Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 113
(1st Cir. 1999); see also Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“[I]t is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under Rule 24(b) and
even though there is a common question of law or fact, or the requirements of Rule 24(b) are
otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention.”).
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For example, in Shaw v. Hunt, two groups of citizens sued the
state for racial gerrymandering of a voting district. While the litigation was ongoing, the Supreme Court changed the standing require115
ments for voters in such challenges. Under the new standard, some
of the voters could not remain as plaintiffs in the case.116 Nonetheless,
the district court recognized the important contribution the original
plaintiffs made to the litigation over the years and granted them permissive intervention.117
When unique facts and circumstances exist, such as those described above, permissive intervention gives the district judge discre118
tion to fashion a just party structure. But if one carries to its logical
conclusion the proposition that adding parties without standing to a
case destroys federal jurisdiction, then permissive intervention as
written is unconstitutional in many cases. Nonetheless, courts in both
the D.C. and Eighth circuits apparently see no contradiction in applying Article III standing to a motion to intervene as of right, while
using a purely pragmatic approach to grants of permissive intervention.119
In sum, it is inconsistent to single out, as have the Eighth and
D.C. Circuits, intervention as of right for special treatment. Rule
24(a)(2) is one of several rules by which nonparties without standing
may be included in a case. Unless the courts and Congress are prepared to turn back the clock and restrict participants in multiparty

114. 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 163.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See also Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5-98CV-270, 1999 WL 1022130, at *2–4 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 5, 1999) (allowing the governor to intervene permissively in a settlement regarding
the award of attorneys’ fees to the state’s private counsel, even though the court determined
that he neither had standing, nor satisfied the criteria for intervention as of right).
119. Standard Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 137 F.3d 567, 570,
573 (8th Cir. 1998) (denying intervention as of right because Article III standing is a prerequisite, but denying permissive intervention because the applicant did not meet the terms of Rule
24(b)); EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (adopting a
generous and flexible interpretation of Rule 24(b) to allow permissive intervention to gain access to materials shielded by a protective order); City of Williams v. Dombeck, No. 00CV66,
2000 WL 33675559, at *2, *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) (noting that a Rule 24(a)(2) interest is
equivalent to standing, while permissive intervention is an inherently discretionary enterprise);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l REO Mgmt. Inc., 205 F.R.D. 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 2000) (granting
permissive intervention after finding that the intervenor’s interest—seen through the lens of
Article III standing—was insufficient).
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litigation only to those with Article III standing, intervenors as of
right should not be required to bear the standing burden alone.
B. If Intervenors Want to Act Like a Party, They Must Meet The
Same Requirements
The second rationale for making standing an additional requirement for intervention is that since intervenors want to participate “on
equal footing” with the parties they should meet the same standards
120
imposed on the original parties. “Because an intervenor seeks to
become a ‘suitor,’ and asks the court to ‘decide the merits of the dis121
pute,’” which include his own issues, he is no different from a party.
Requiring intervenors who want to act like parties to meet the same
criteria as parties has a persuasive common sense appeal.122
Courts traditionally accorded full party status to intervenors of
right, allowing them to file briefs, present witnesses, and participate in
123
all aspects of the litigation. The plain language of Rule 24(a)—unlike that of 24(b)—does not anticipate conditioning participation of
intervenors as of right,124 but the Advisory Committee’s notes to the
1966 amendments permit courts to curtail their litigation activities
125
where appropriate. Although such limits are not common, some

120. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
121. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
122. I adopt a variation of this argument in my proposal. If intervenors are seeking relief,
then they share the same intent of named parties and should demonstrate standing. See infra
Part V.
123. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general rule, intervenors are
permitted to litigate fully once admitted to a suit.” (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1997))); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1996) (“An intervenor acquires the
rights of a party.”); Appel, supra note 56, at 277 (explaining that courts treated intervenors as
full parties because the right to intervene was traditionally limited to those who had a close relationship to a case).
124. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 382 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (“[A] district court has less discretion to limit the participation of an intervenor
of right than that of a permissive intervenor.”); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 44, § 1922, at 505
(“Rule 24(a) does not authorize the imposition of conditions and the court, in theory at least,
has no discretion to refuse intervention to one who satisfies the requirement of that rule.”).
125. “An intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of
the proceedings.” Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 111 (1966) (Advisory
Committee’s note).
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126

courts have availed themselves of this option.
Given that intervention can impose substantial costs on the
original parties and the judicial process—through complicating the
litigation, creating delays, or blocking settlement—courts may be using Article III standing to weed out potentially troublesome interve127
nors. If so, it is a particularly blunt instrument for dealing with concerns of judicial efficiency. Expressing perhaps a common fear, a
Seventh Circuit opinion paints an unflattering picture of intervenors:
The intervenor seeks control of the suit, acquires a right to conduct
the case in a way that may undermine the interests of the original
plaintiff (this may, indeed, be the intervenor’s principal objective, if
the intervenor contends that it has interests adverse to that
128
party) . . . . It is hard to treat a party such as [this] as a fifth wheel.

Whether they take advantage of it or not, the courts are at liberty to
craft the terms under which intervenors may take part in an existing
lawsuit. As I propose in Part V, standing should not be used to completely slam the door on intervenors. Rather, the negative aspects of
intervention may be minimized through greater use of conditioning
participation of intervenors of right.
IV. STANDING AS A GUIDE FOR DETERMINING WHAT
CONSTITUTES A “LEGALLY PROTECTABLE INTEREST”
Article III standing should not be used as a proxy for the interest
requirement of Rule 24(a) because the two tests have radically different purposes. Broadly speaking, Article III standing is a test concerning past or imminent harm that is independent of a court’s adjudication, while intervention is concerned with preventing speculated
harm that may result from court action. In other words, an intervenor
126. Beauregard, Inc. v. Sword Servs. LLC, 107 F.3d 351, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming
conditions placed on a Rule 24(a) intervenor because “it is now a firmly established principle
that reasonable conditions may be imposed even upon one who intervenes as of right”); Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 961 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting intervenors to raise only one issue and instructing the district court to narrowly limit discovery accordingly); United States v.
Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. 408, 420 (D. Minn. 1972) (granting intervention as of right subject to
orders regarding the intervenors’ participation in a variety of litigation activities).
127. Tobias, supra note 39, at 440 (commenting that many courts have used standing to deny
intervention to those that they perceive as intermeddlers). Professor Emma Jones argues that
the problem of meddlesome intervenors is overblown, because the expense of litigation helps
ensure that those who seek to intervene have a serious interest at stake. See Panel Discussion,
Intervention in Public Law Litigation, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 265, 265 (1980).
128. Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988).
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seeks to protect his interest from harm that has neither occurred nor
been threatened, but rather is a possible result of the court’s decision
in the pending case. By contrast, the plaintiff’s injury in the standing
context exists independently of the court; it has been allegedly caused
or threatened by the defendant. Although a speculative harm would
be insufficient for a plaintiff to seek relief from the court, the entire
rationale for intervention is to protect nonparties from possible consequences of a court’s decision.
If Article III standing is used as the method for testing an intervenor’s “interest” under Rule 24(a)(2), legitimate applicants will be
blocked from participating, undermining the benefits of the Rule. For
example, the Department of Labor brought suit against an exotic
dancing establishment, “Heavenly Bodies,” for violating the Fair La129
bor Standards Act. The liability of Heavenly Bodies turned on
whether the exotic dancers were independent contractors or employees.130 Two dancers sought to intervene as of right as partiesdefendant to protect their interest in being considered independent
131
contractors. If the court required the dancers to have standing, they
could not have met the Article III burden because it is the government—not the employees—that is injured by violations of federal
statutes.132 Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit recognized that an adverse ruling against the dancers, i.e., that they were employees, would
“deny [them] a certain degree of leverage in negotiating their employment conditions.”133 The court acknowledged that the harm to the
dancers “may appear to some [as] speculative”—a concession that
would doom an Article III standing inquiry—but allowed the dancers
to intervene because there was a possibility that their interests could
be impaired as a result of the government’s suit.134
Likewise, in Cotter v. Massachusetts Association of Minority Law
135
Enforcement Officers, a group of white police officers sued the City
of Boston for race discrimination in its promotion procedures, which
they claimed resulted in the advancement of three black sergeants to
officer positions at their expense.136 The individual black officers, and
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 320, 323.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id.
219 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id. at 32.
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a professional association of minority police officers, subsequently
moved to intervene alongside the city to defend the contested promo137
tion policies. On the one hand, if one used Article III standing
analysis to determine whether they had an “interest,” the black officers’ motion would be denied. They have not incurred an injury—
they were promoted. Furthermore, the possibility of injury is highly
speculative. The court would have to hold not only that the promotion procedures were unconstitutional, but reverse the black officers’
promotions as well. On the other hand, as the court ultimately concluded in allowing the officers to intervene,138 “to say an officer has no
interest in defending his own promotion would be to defy common
139
sense.” Moreover, the court granted the minority association’s motion to intervene because it acknowledged that the outcome of the
case would likely impact its members in a substantial and concrete
manner.140
As the situations described above illustrate, nonparties may have
quite obvious interests that could be significantly impaired by a
court’s resolution of a dispute between the named plaintiff and defendant. Clearly, how the court will decide cannot be known at the
outset of litigation, so potential impact on interests is by definition
speculative. But current standing doctrine rejects speculative injuries.141 Thus, courts are sabotaging Rule 24 intervenors’ motions if
they use standing analysis as a substitute for assessing their interest in
a case.
Another difficulty with using standing to inform the interest requirement is that standing doctrine is constantly evolving, and inter142
pretations of the Court’s guidance on standing vary widely. The
Court has confessed that “the concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not

137. Id. at 33.
138. Id. at 37.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Id. at 37. The court recognized that civil rights litigation does not easily fit the classic
bipolar model of plaintiff and defendant. “[A]lthough the case may be sparked by a particular
episode, the decision may be likely to control an ongoing process” that could affect many others. Id. For the same reasons, Professor Jenkins argues that “the ordinary operation of Rule
24 . . . almost always entitles the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs to intervention as
of right in suits challenging those programs.” Jenkins, supra note 4, at 269 (footnote omitted).
141. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
142. See Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104,
109 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The case law interpreting standing requirements under Article III is, to put
it mildly, ‘one of the most confused areas of the law.’” (quoting CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28,
at 38)).
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been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases” it
143
has decided. On the one hand, one commentator viewed Justice
Scalia’s standing vision in Lujan with its “[i]ndividualized harm, stringent rules of causation and . . . demand for near-certain redressability” as erecting a significantly higher barrier to plaintiffs, particularly
144
those representing public interests. On the other hand, several circuits have characterized standing as a “modest” test.145 For example,
the Seventh Circuit declared that any interest that could meet the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) “is sufficient to satisfy the Article
III standing requirement as well.”146 Incorporating standing doctrine,
and all of its attendant confusion and controversy, will hardly bring
clarity to applying Rule 24’s interest requirement.
V. REQUIRING STANDING OF INTERVENORS WHO EITHER SEEK OR
ARE SUBJECT TO RELIEF
Several commentators have weighed in on the role—if any—of
147
Article III standing to intervention. With some exceptions, most argue that Article III standing should have no bearing on intervention.148 I argue that taking sides obscures the issue. A bright-line rule

143. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
144. Gene R. Nichol, The Impossibility of Lujan’s Project, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
193, 201 (2001) (pointing out that the Court’s strict approach to the elements of standing is at
odds with public law litigation).
145. Daggett, 172 F.3d at 109 (allowing intervention by potential political candidates to defend a state campaign finance law because their interest in the matter met the “rather modest
requirements of Article III”).
146. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997).
147. Appel, supra note 56, at 283, 289 (concluding that the addition of Article III standing to
Rule 24(a)(2) is not supported by Supreme Court precedent, but suggesting that it may be a useful way to focus the evaluation of the intervenor’s relationship to the litigation); Rodrick J. Coffey, Giving a Hoot About an Owl Does Not Satisfy the Interest Requirement for Intervention: The
Misapplication of Intervention as of Right in Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for
Stable Economic Growth v. Department of the Interior, 1998 BYU L. REV. 811, 833 (calling for
the Tenth Circuit to reverse its course and “establish Article III standing as the standard by
which the interests of applicants for intervention are evaluated”); Cindy Vreeland, Comment,
Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(A), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279,
304 (1990) (arguing that associational standing is a useful framework for intervention by public
interest groups).
148. See Bullock, supra note 3, at 638–43 (arguing that intervention should be kept separate
from standing because standing doctrine is chaotic and does not apply to defendants, and to do
otherwise would defeat the policies of Rule 24); Gardner, supra note 110, at 699–702 (proposing
that parties be permitted to intervene as long as they satisfy the terms of the Rule and the original parties satisfy Article III); Tobias, supra note 39, at 447–48 (proposing a case-by-case bal-

KARASTELEV.DOC

480

01/13/03 1:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:455

implicitly assumes that intervenors are a homogeneous group—nonparties who want to join the plaintiff’s cause, demand full participation in the litigation, and seek separate relief. But in fact, as discussed
above, defendant-intervenors are quite common, and they may want
only to protect an interest rather than seek relief, and might be satis149
fied with limited participation rather than full rights as parties. Accordingly, requiring Article III standing of intervenors should depend
on the intent of the intervenor—does he seek relief (or could he be
subject to such relief), or is he seeking to protect an interest?
On the one hand, if a plaintiff-intervenor had a claim for relief
(or as a defendant-intervenor could be subject to such claims), then
the plaintiff-intervenor should be required to demonstrate standing
(or, in the case of the defendant-intervenor, demonstrate a case or
controversy against an original plaintiff with standing). For example
150
in United States v. LTV Steel Company, the Group Against Smog
and Pollution (GASP) sought intervention in a government suit
against a coke production plant for air emissions violations in order to
obtain relief for GASP members living in the area.151 GASP also
sought to participate in discovery, testifying, presenting evidence, and
152
cross-examining witnesses. In such a case, where the intervenor easily steps into the shoes of a party-plaintiff, requiring standing is reasonable.153
On the other hand, if an intervenor seeks only to protect an interest, is not pursuing his own claim, is not subject to a claim, and is
willing to have his participation conditioned, then he should not have
154
to demonstrate a case or controversy as to himself. Keeping with
ancing test of the applicant’s potential contribution to the merits of the case versus the costs to
the judicial system of adding parties).
149. Both Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp. and Cotter v. Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority
Law Enforcement Officers involved defendant-intervenors seeking to protect their interests
rather than requesting relief. See supra notes 129–39 and accompanying text; see also George M.
Strickler, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557, 1587 (1990) (“Those who seek to intervene as defendants often
will not be seeking any affirmative relief for themselves and, far from alleging that injury to
them is certain, typically will contend that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief.”).
150. 187 F.R.D. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
151. Id. at 524.
152. Id.
153. Interestingly, although the Third Circuit has not addressed the circuit split, the district
court in this case did engage in a standing analysis, and found that GASP passed the test. Id. at
525–26.
154. But cf. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 2, at 50-51 (1998) (likening defendant intervenors who seek to protect their interests to parties in a declaratory judgment action who do have a justiciable controversy between
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155

the environmental theme, Herdman v. Town of Angelica involved a
citizens’ group that had worked closely with the town to draft and
pass a local ordinance that restricted construction and operation of
156
solid-waste facilities in the area. Then, when a company that wanted
to construct such a facility challenged the constitutionality of the law,
the citizens’ group sought to intervene to assist the town in defending
157
it. The district court rigorously applied Rule 24(a)(2), but correctly
did not require justiciability as to those defendant-intervenors who
158
sought to protect a variety of interests but were not seeking, or were
not the potential targets of, separate relief.159
For those concerned that such an approach would open the
floodgates to interest-intervenors, the courts have two tools at their
disposal: the discretion to condition the participation of intervenors,160
and denial of intervention when the intervenors’ interest is already
adequately represented by an existing party.161
Depending on the nature of an intervenor’s interest, a court may
weigh whether he should be permitted to contest all the issues and
162
enjoy all the prerogatives of a party litigant. For example, a court
163
may limit the issues an intervenor may raise. A judge may permit

each other).
155. 163 F.R.D. 180 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
156. Id. at 183.
157. Id. at 182–83.
158. The citizens’ group had three interests: preserving the health and safety of the community; maintaining the legislation; and preserving the integrity of a separate administrative proceeding it had initiated regarding the issuance of the permit to the landfill company. Id. at 183.
159. The district court did not raise the issue of limiting the participation of the citizens’
group. It is likely that the group’s participation would have been quite significant, because it
successfully argued that the town had limited financial resources to defend the litigation and was
less committed to the constitutional issues at stake. Id. at 190.
160. See supra note 125 and accompanying text; Vreeland, supra note 147, at 307–08 (arguing that “[l]imited intervention is a useful tool because it allows courts to incorporate the benefits of intervention yet minimize complications, delays, and added expenses” (footnote omitted)).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
162. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179–80 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (rejecting a focus on the “interest” test of Rule 24, and favoring a pragmatic approach that looks at adequacy of representation and explores ways to condition participation).
163. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Martin, No. Civ. A. 1:96-CV-926, 1996 WL 452257, at *3 (N.D.
Ga. June 17, 1996) (granting intervention as of right to the extent the intervenors sought to defend the plaintiff’s claims but not for purposes of seeking cross-claims or counterclaims); Wilder
v. Bernstein, No. 78 CIV. 957, 1994 WL 30480, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1994) (limiting intervenors “to their stated purpose” and barring relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings
and not raised by the existing plaintiffs).
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164
intervention for specific motions, and may curtail an intervenor’s
presentation of evidence or participation in discovery.165 Where multiple intervenors are involved, a court may require that they choose a
representative spokesperson and combine discovery and motion requests.166 Thus, courts have a whole host of options for proactively
limiting the potential disruption to an ongoing case by the addition of
an intervenor, without blocking his participation completely.
Furthermore, courts are adept at disposing of motions to intervene on the basis that the applicant’s interest is already “adequately
167
represented by the existing parties.” Despite the Supreme Court’s
holding that the burden of showing inadequacy of representation
168
should be minimal, it still is used to winnow out intervenors perceived as meddlesome. In fact, tests of “inadequacy” tend to vary de169
pending on the strength of the interest. “Courts might require very
little ‘inadequacy’ if the would-be intervenor’s home were at stake
and a great deal if the [intervenor’s] interest was thin and widely
shared,”170 or if the government is one of the parties.
For example, in Chiles v. Thornburgh,171 Dade County sued the
United States for its practice of housing alien felons with nonviolent

164. W. Res., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 00-2043-CM, 2001 WL 1718370, at *6 (D.
Kan. Sept. 12, 2001) (granting an intervenor’s motion to intervene for the unique and limited
purpose of filing a motion for a protective order with regard to disclosure of private and confidential contracts).
165. Southern v. Plumb Tools, 696 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the district
court erred in not preventing the plaintiff-intervenor from testifying to the jury that the plaintiff
had received worker’s compensation benefits for his injury). In United States v. Duke Energy
Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 560 (M.D.N.C. 2001), the court held that “[a]pplicants have an unconditional right to intervene, but this does not prevent the imposition of reasonable limitations on
Applicants’ participation to ensure the efficient adjudication of the litigation.” Id. at 565. It suggested that the magistrate judge might limit the three public interest environmental groups’ involvement in ongoing discovery as well as their ability to initiate independent discovery. Id.
166. Sierra Club, 1996 WL 452257, at *5 (suggesting that the three separate defendantintervenors and the defendants consolidate discovery in order to reduce the legal expenses for
all parties).
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
168. Trobovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (“The requirement of
the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal.”).
169. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (“A
showing that a very strong interest exists may warrant intervention upon a lesser showing of impairment or inadequacy of representation. Similarly, where representation is clearly inadequate,
a lesser interest may suffice as a basis for granting intervention.”).
170. Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 112–13
(1st Cir. 1999).
171. 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989).
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alien detainees at the Krome federal detention facility in Dade
172
County, Florida. Two separate groups sought to intervene: several
173
Krome detainees and individual homeowners living near the facility.
On the one hand, the Eleventh Circuit held that Dade County might
not adequately represent the plight of the aliens at Krome if its main
concern was the safety of nearby homeowners, and therefore permit174
ted the detainees’ motion. On the other hand, the court denied intervention to the homeowners, because it found that they shared an
identical interest adequately represented by Dade County—prevention of riots and escapes from Krome into the surrounding community.175 Thus, the court was able to control the number of parties to the
litigation by evaluating adequacy of representation, instead of by applying the more restrictive Article III standing test.
In sum, the circuit split over whether intervenors should demonstrate Article III standing—either as an additional test or as a way to
prove their Rule 24(a) “interest”—masks the real issue. In evaluating
motions to intervene, courts should analyze the intervenor’s intent,
and based on this determination, Article III standing may or may not
be an appropriate requirement. If an intervenor looks like a party
(because he is requesting or blocking relief) and wants to act like a
party (by participating in all aspects of litigation), then it is only reasonable that the plaintiff-intervenor show standing, or that the defendant-intervenor has a justiciable case with the original plaintiff. But, if
the intervenor merely seeks to protect an interest that might be impaired by existing litigation, standing doctrine is misplaced. Imposing
a standing requirement is particularly inappropriate as a method for
preventing intervenors from joining a lawsuit in the interests of judicial efficiency, because courts have other weapons at their disposal,
such as conditioning the intervenors participation, or finding that
their interests are already adequately represented.
CONCLUSION
The underlying purpose of intervention is not being served by
the current application of Rule 24 in some federal courts of appeals.
First, the Eighth and D.C. Circuits have ignored the logical consequences of insisting that any party without standing that becomes in172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1200, 1214.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1215.
Id.
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volved in a litigation automatically destroys federal court jurisdiction
over a case. To be consistent, courts would also have to require
standing of parties who seek to intervene permissively or to be joined.
Since neither any court nor the Rules drafters have ever suggested
that standing should be required in the latter circumstances, it raises
serious doubts as to how it can be justified for intervenors under Rule
24(a)(2).
Second, there is no sensitivity to the fact that most intervenors
seek to enter litigation on the defendant’s side. Not surprisingly, then,
applying a plaintiff-focused doctrine like standing to defendantintervenors is counterproductive. While a showing of only “speculative harm” automatically destroys a plaintiff’s standing, the core principle of intervention is to protect an intervenor’s interests from
speculated harm from a court’s action in the existing case. Since the
tests operate in contradiction to one another, it makes no sense to use
one to inform the other.
Third, the courts of appeals have generally assumed that all intervenors want to be full parties and thus have not fully exploited
their discretion to condition intervenors’ participation, preferring instead to use standing to block their involvement completely. It is fair
to surmise that given the choice between being barred from a case
completely and being allowed some limited participation, intervenors
with an interest to protect would gladly acquiesce to the latter. Applying standing as a way to reduce litigation complexities or remove
supposed intermeddlers solves too much. However, when intervenors
seek specific relief against one of the parties, and insist on full party
rights, they begin to closely resemble the role of plaintiffs, and requiring standing is reasonable.
Given the disparate goals of intervenors and their differing degrees of desired participation in a lawsuit, it is impractical to have a
one-size-fits-all rule regarding standing’s relationship to intervention.
It is time for courts to realign their application of Rule 24 with its objective of bringing in nonparties whose interests may be at risk in a
pending litigation. Courts should avail themselves of their discretion
to condition intervenors’ participation to ensure manageability of the
litigation and minimize prejudice to the existing parties. Likewise, in
those few cases when intervenors seek a form of relief and want to
litigate as full parties they should meet Article III standing requirements.

